The dimensionality of black nationalism and African-American political participation

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This article examines the dimensionality of black nationalism and its relationship to African-American political participation, focusing specifically on blacks’ electoral and non-electoral involvement. An analysis of the 1993–94 National Black Politics Study confirms earlier findings that reveal two key strains of black nationalist thought, namely community and separatist nationalism. Most importantly, the analysis demonstrates that both versions drive distinct forms of political activity. Community nationalism increases electoral and non-electoral involvement among African Americans, while separatist nationalists tend to abstain from voting.

Keywords: African American; nationalism; political participation; racial and ethnic politics

Introduction

Black nationalism has been associated with some of the most prominent socio-political movements within the African-American community. Martin R. Delany’s black emigration movement in the nineteenth century, Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the black power movement in the latter end of the 1960s were influenced by the core tenets of black nationalist thought (Austin 2006). Given its historical significance to African-American politics, there is reason to believe black nationalism mobilizes African Americans to pursue their collective political interests. Nevertheless, the empirical record offers mixed results. Overall, the evidence suggests black nationalism increases some forms of political participation (e.g. protest activities and joining black organizations) and has a negative or negligible impact on others (e.g. voting, contacting public officials) (Marx 1967; Dawson 2001). To date, these inconsistencies have not been resolved in the empirical literature.

For this study, I propose that two distinct forms of black nationalism – community and separatist nationalism – encourage involvement in certain political activities and discourage participation in others. Prior work by Brown and Shaw (2002) demonstrates community and separatist nationalism reflect different attitudinal and strategic approaches to advancing the interests of African Americans. Nevertheless, they neglected to examine the relationship between both versions of black nationalism and African-Americans’ political participation. This study advances their findings by showing that community and separatist nationalism motivate distinctly different types of political involvement. The analysis below shows community nationalism, which emphasizes the need for blacks to work within the existing political system to secure resources for their communities, sparks greater engagement in campaigns as well as non-electoral political activities. On the other hand, separatist nationalism, which reflects a disenchantment with the prevailing
political system, has little impact on either campaign involvement or non-electoral participation, but a strong, negative influence on voter turnout.

Community and separatist nationalism

Black nationalism is an ideology that emphasizes self-determination, self-reliance, black pride, and, to a lesser extent, the belief in a separate black nation. Historically, it has served as the primary counterweight to the liberal tradition, and particularly racial integrationism, by questioning America’s commitment to racial equality (Dawson 2001).¹ To combat racial oppression, black nationalist thought – like the nationalisms of other minority populations around the world – proposes an attitudinal and strategic approach for overcoming social and political systems of exclusion and domination by achieving greater economic, political and cultural autonomy (Kellas 1998; Watson 1990). To these ends, black nationalism drives stronger support among African Americans for patronizing black-owned businesses, controlling the economic and political institutions in their communities as well as teaching black children African languages, and creating all-black male schools (Tate 1993; Brown and Shaw 2002; Davis and Brown 2002).

For some time, theorists have recognized that there are different versions of black nationalism within the African-American community (Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick 1970; Cruse 1967; Dawson 2001; Hamilton 1973; Shelby 2005). Specifically, their work reveals two dominant strains of black nationalism, namely community and separatist nationalism.² Ultimately, community and separatist nationalism reflect different levels of confidence in the ability of the American political system to secure racial equality.

Community and separatist nationalism emerged in the black community early in American history (Cruse 1967). Martin Delaney, who is considered the father of black nationalism, oscillated between these two approaches depending upon the treatment of African Americans at the time (Shelby 2005). Delany led the black emigration effort to Africa in the early nineteenth century; however, Shelby (2005) highlights that Delany concurrently worked within the political system. In fact, he quickly abandoned the emigration movement in support of political reform and racial inclusion after blacks gained their citizenship rights during Reconstruction (Shelby 2005, 53). Both versions of nationalism developed as different strategic responses to racial discrimination and subjugation. Community nationalism developed early among African Americans as they realized they should consolidate what limited economic and political power they possessed to gain some independence from white hegemony. On the other hand, Shelby (2005) contends separatist nationalism emerged as a reactionary, rhetorical posture that allowed blacks to disassociate themselves as mere victims of white oppression by asserting their right to self-determination.

Community nationalism reflects blacks’ desire to gain greater control over their communities by working within the American political and economic systems. Specifically, proponents of community nationalism promote the virtues of economic empowerment within the black community. In fact, community nationalists believe there is no basis for political power without economic power. Elections are viewed as a means of gaining greater political and economic control and securing resources for their communities (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Dawson 2001). Furthermore, while critical of American pluralism, proponents of community nationalism argue America’s group-based, pluralist political system requires blacks to gain power by controlling their own political and economic institutions (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). Only after establishing an independent base of economic and political power do community nationalists consider blacks on a footing to wrestle concessions from mainstream society. Thus, underlying community nationalism is a belief in the legitimacy of American pluralism and democratic values.
On the other hand, separatist nationalism challenges and, in some cases, rejects the legitimacy
of the American political process. While similarly stressing the need for black autonomy, separa-
tist nationalism breaks from community nationalism by emphasizing the need for blacks to
combat and become independent of the existing social and political structure and, to a lesser
extent, the territorial boundaries of the United States.3 While an important element of earlier
nationalist movements, modern versions of separatist nationalism are driven less by a desire
for territory than for political and social isolation from mainstream society. For example, the
Nation of Islam, a black nationalist Muslim organization, advocates for the establishment of an
independent black nation-state, but also seeks to reinforce the political and cultural separation
of blacks and whites through, among other things, the establishment of separate schools for
black children, an exemption for African Americans from taxation, and the prohibition of inter-
racial marriage.4 While the Nation of Islam promotes measures to become more independent from
the political system, they are also engaged in the political process. Yet, unlike community nation-
alism, political action for separatist nationalism focuses more on challenging the racial status quo
and – barring complete separation from mainstream America – securing equal rights and access to
resources. Ultimately, these measures reflect distrust in the capacity of the prevailing political,
social, and economic establishment to deliver on advancing black interests.

Empirical analyses of black nationalism
Thus far, the empirical literature has largely treated black nationalism as a one-dimensional con-
struct, with singular political consequences and supporters with uniform characteristics (Davis
and Brown 2002; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Block Jr. 2011). Only recently have empiri-
cists begun to create measures that capture alternative forms of nationalist beliefs (Austin 2006;
Brown and Shaw 2002). Brown and Shaw (2002) uncovered two dimensions which they interpret
as community and separatist nationalism. The authors discover that both community and separa-
tist nationalism are endorsed by different subgroups within the black community and lead to
divergent political attitudes. According to their findings, community nationalists tend to be
young and more affluent, while separatist nationalists are, on average, young, male, and
lower-income blacks. Furthermore, Brown and Shaw reveal that both dimensions predict dispa-
rate strategies for black advancement. In particular, the pluralist principles underlying community
nationalism make its proponents more willing to pursue political coalitions with other racial and
ethnic groups and less prone to center the civil rights struggle exclusively around racial issues. In
contrast, separatist nationalism leads to less support for cross-racial coalitions and greater empha-
sis on making race the centerpiece of the struggle for civil rights. Brown and Shaw’s (2002) find-
ings are compelling because they correspond with the existing theoretical literature. In keeping
with Brown and Shaw (2002), my expectation is that one-dimensional measures of black
nationalism overshadow two coherent, underlying dimensions of community and separatist
nationalism.

Notwithstanding, other researchers continue to affirm a single dimension of black national-
ism. Using the same data, Davis and Brown (2002) discover only one dimension of black national-
ism that garnered support primarily from men and the young. The results from Davis and Brown
(2002) are in keeping with most of the empirical literature, but, again, these studies are inconsist-
ent with the work offered by political theorists over the years. This article is, in part, an effort to
resolve the disagreement between Brown and Shaw (2002) and Davis and Brown (2002) to under-
score how the structure of black nationalism may lend important insights into African-American
political participation.

Of course, by distinguishing between community and separatist nationalism, I do not mean to
preclude the existence of other variations of black nationalist thought.5 Instead, I intend to merely
highlight the two most dominant contemporary versions of black nationalism. Nor am I suggesting that community and separatist nationalism are not related. There are clear separatist tendencies among community nationalists (Dawson 2001). Blacks that subscribe to separatist nationalism also occasionally promote efforts to secure certain provisions for blacks from the government. Nevertheless, while both versions are related, they draw support from distinctly different subgroups within the African-American community and lead to divergent political attitudes (Brown and Shaw 2002).

**Determinants of community and separatist nationalism**

According to the empirical literature, some subgroups of African Americans are more likely to endorse black nationalism than others. With regard to age, young blacks tend to find black nationalism more appealing than older African Americans (Marx 1967; Davis and Brown 2002). There are two reasons why this might be the case. First, young people generally hold attitudes that are more unstable, less crystalized, and less internalized than older people (Sears 1986). Among young blacks, this tends to translate into their greater receptivity to more militant ideas, and particularly separatist movements (Thornton, Tran, and Taylor 1997). Young blacks have supported some of the more prominent separatist movements in the black community (Marx 1967). Therefore, while I expect young people to be drawn to both versions of black nationalism more than older blacks, they should express stronger support for separatist nationalism than community nationalism.

Furthermore, I expect there to be greater support among men for separatist nationalism than women, while there should be no significant difference in the support between men and women for community nationalism. Black separatist movements in the United States have tended to have strong patriarchal tendencies (Austin 2006; Dawson 2001). Accordingly, previous studies have shown men were stronger supporters of black separatism than women (Marx 1967; Brown and Shaw 2002; Davis and Brown 2002). For this reason, I expect separatist nationalism to draw greater support from men than women. Nevertheless, the more pragmatic, pluralist approach of community nationalism places greater value on forging political alliances with other groups (Brown and Shaw 2002). Therefore, women would feel less inclined to subordinate their gendered interests to their pursuit of black advancement. As such, I do not expect there to be a difference in the support for community nationalism between men and women.

Lastly, I expect there to be a difference in support for community and separatist nationalism along the lines of class status, with more affluent blacks, on average, supporting community nationalism and less affluent blacks supporting separatist nationalism. Since higher-income blacks stand to lose more from an entire restructuring of the American political and economic systems, they are expected to be drawn to community nationalism’s implicit legitimization of the political establishment. As a means of maintaining their status, higher-income blacks may prefer to push for reforms within the existing political structure. On the other hand, the relatively few economic concessions afforded to low-income blacks is likely to make them less attached to the status quo and, consequently, more attracted to separatist nationalism.

**Black nationalism and political participation**

While Brown and Shaw (2002) show that both dimensions of black nationalism have clear implications for blacks’ political attitudes, they provide no evidence of the relationship between community and separatist nationalism and African-Americans’ political participation. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe both versions of black nationalism influence how blacks choose to engage the political system (see Chong and Rogers 2005, 351–352). This study contributes
to our understanding of the political implications of black nationalism by examining how community and separatist nationalism impact blacks’ political involvement.

Empirical analyses of the relationship between black nationalism and African-American political behavior began with the groundbreaking work of Gary Marx’s *Protest and Prejudice* (1967). Marx discovered that nationalists reported less involvement in social activities, such as reading newspapers, joining black organizations and voting, than other black radicals, but more than African Americans that were neither nationalists nor activists. Later work reveals that support for black nationalism was positively related to some forms of non-electoral political activity (e.g. attending protests, joining black organizations, and signing petitions for political candidates), but negatively related or unrelated to more mainstream forms of political participation (Chong and Rogers 2005; Davis and Brown 2002; Brown and Shaw 2002; Dawson 2001). Taken together, the relationship between black nationalism and African Americans’ political participation is unclear.

In the present analysis, I distinguish between electoral and non-electoral political participation. Electoral and non-electoral activities are similar to the conceptual distinction between conventional and unconventional participation made by Verba and his colleagues (1995). Verba and his associates (1995) describe conventional activities as more formalized, electorally focused and nationally centered than unconventional modes of involvement. Moreover, among conventional activities, a further distinction is made. While most literature on electoral behavior concentrates on the act of voting, the researchers argue that voting is unique to other electoral activities and, thus, our understanding of voting behavior should not be generalized to other forms of conventional participation. For instance, Verba and his associates differentiate voting from campaign-related activities. Voting constitutes a singular activity, is equalized across citizens, and serves as a “blunt” instrument for communicating information (23–24). On the other hand, campaign activities allow for a variety of political input, differ in volume from person to person, and communicate ambiguous, diverse messages. Consequently, in this study, I distinguish between voting and other electoral participation, such as campaign activities. Unlike electoral involvement, non-electoral participation includes activities that are more organizational, protest-driven and grassroots-oriented. Furthermore, non-electoral involvement takes place outside of the confines of formal organizational channels. Verba and his colleagues also point out that non-electoral participation tends to have a high capacity for communicating information and significant variation in volume between citizens. I use electoral and non-electoral participation as labels to signify whether citizens utilize formal, electoral channels or non-electoral, grassroots-oriented activities to influence the political establishment.

Ultimately, I propose that the inconsistencies in the relationship between black nationalism and political participation can be explained by considering that distinct versions of black nationalist thought may have varied political consequences. In particular, there is reason to believe community and separatist nationalism motivate blacks to get involved in electoral and non-electoral politics to varying degrees and, perhaps, even discourage them from participating in certain activities. By measuring black nationalism as a one-dimensional construct, researchers are missing the distinct ways in which each version of black nationalism drives political participation.

For example, community nationalism endorses the use of mainstream political institutions to pursue black interests and political reform. As mentioned above, electoral campaigns are perceived by community nationalists as a means of gaining greater community control by securing critical resources from the government. As such, its proponents are more likely to engage in mainstream electoral participation to resolve their grievances. Given these considerations, I believe community nationalism will increase electoral activities, such as voter turnout and campaign activities. In addition, community nationalism’s emphasis on community control suggests its proponents will gravitate toward political activities that empower community members as well as...
allow them to vocalize and resolve local grievances (Dawson 2001). Accordingly, my expectation is that **community nationalism will increase grassroots, non-electoral participation**.

On the other hand, proponents of separatist nationalism are fundamentally skeptical of the ability of electoral activities to advance black interests. Participation in mainstream electoral politics is likely to be viewed by separatist nationalists as a legitimation of the prevailing political structure. Therefore, they may opt out of activities that appear to endorse the existing political system. Accordingly, I expect **separatist nationalism to predict lower levels of voting and electoral participation**. However, the relationship between separatist nationalism and non-electoral behavior is unclear. Separatist nationalism may drive greater participation in non-electoral political activities as a way of giving members of their community a voice to combat mistreatment. They could perceive non-electoral activities as a more legitimate way of serving their communities than electoral involvement. Alternatively, separatist nationalism may reflect a general disenchantment with all forms of political engagement, driving its proponents to abstain from both electoral and non-electoral activities alike.

**Black linked fate**

Black nationalism should be distinguished from blacks’ group attachment. Of course, African Americans’ feelings of racial solidarity cannot be entirely separated from their nationalist beliefs. Davis and Brown (2002) argue that blacks’ perceived linked fate, or their view that group members share similar economic and symbolic interests, should be understood as a necessary component of black nationalism. However, conceptual differences remain. Black nationalism is a strategic approach for advancing blacks’ political, economic, and social interests. In contrast, while individuals’ attachment to the condition of the in-group may motivate them to pursue ameliorative political strategies, the link is not automatic.

Previous work examining the relationship between blacks’ perceived linked fate and their political participation shows linked fate increases some forms of electoral and non-electoral participation and has a negligible impact on others (Avery 2006; Chong and Rogers 2005). When utilizing components of group consciousness other than black linked fate, the same mixed patterns emerge (Avery 2006; Chong and Rogers 2005). Ultimately, I argue that the mixed relationship between black common fate and different forms of political participation reflect that, while blacks’ group attachment may motivate political behavior, it requires a coherent set of beliefs or values for it to be translated into strategic political action.

**Data and methods**

Survey data for this study come from the 1993–94 National Black Politics Study (NBPS), which are the same data utilized in both Brown and Shaw (2002) and Davis and Brown (2002). This study consists of a multiple frame, random-digit-dial probability sample. Multiple frame surveys are useful for balancing the costs and error involved in sampling from subpopulations by combining two or more frames that provide superior coverage rates than any single frame (Groves 2005). The data were collected over the telephone between December 4, 1993 and February 13, 1994 and have a 65.1% response rate. Only African Americans in the United States over 18 years of age were eligible for the study. Overall, the sample includes 1206 respondents, although the sample may be reduced in specific analyses because of “don’t know” responses and non-responses. The NBPS presented the best available data for this study because they offer items that capture respondents’ participation in various political activities, a large range of black nationalism measures as well as an item that assesses African Americans’ perceived linked fate with other blacks.
The dimensionality of black nationalism

Given the exchange between Brown and Shaw (2002) and Davis and Brown (2002), I begin the analysis by exploring the dimensionality of black nationalist thought in order to later examine its influence on African Americans’ electoral and non-electoral involvement. As mentioned above, Brown and Shaw (2002) reveal two key versions of black nationalism, namely community and separatist nationalism, while Davis and Brown (2002) find evidence for only one coherent dimension. Resolving the differences between their analyses may lend important insights into understanding the relationship between black nationalism and African-American political behavior.

The conflicting findings from Brown and Shaw (2002) and Davis and Brown (2002) are particularly glaring because they are produced from the same data, the 1993–94 NBPS. What can account for this discrepancy? The present study points to differences in the authors’ choice of survey items and factor analytic techniques as the primary reasons for their differing conclusions. First, each paper utilizes a slightly different battery of variables for their analysis. Brown and Shaw (2002) include eight items that measure blacks’ attitudes towards various components of black nationalist ideology; these variables include measures of blacks’ support for shopping in black-owned stores, controlling the economy in their community, controlling the government in their community, relying upon themselves, voting for black candidates, forming their own political party, having their own separate nation and forming a nation within a nation. Davis and Brown (2002) use many of the same variables, but choose to add some measures and drop others. Specifically, they include items that measure whether black children should learn an African language, blacks should participate in black organizations and blacks should support black male schools, which are absent from Brown and Shaw’s analysis. However, Davis and Brown (2002) also omit a measure of whether blacks consider themselves a nation within a nation, a key component of separatist nationalism in Brown and Shaw (2002). The inconsistencies in the items make comparisons between both analyses problematic since changes in the variables can lead to discrepancies in the variance–covariance structure and, consequently, uncover different underlying factors within the data.

Brown and Shaw (2002) use items to capture blacks’ support for shopping in black-owned stores, controlling the economy in their community, controlling the government in their community, and relying upon themselves as observable indicators of community nationalism. Like Brown and Shaw (2002), I believe these measures reflect community nationalism’s emphasis on gaining autonomy for blacks within the prevailing political and economic system. For this reason, they are employed as indicators of community nationalism throughout the analysis.

On the other hand, the appropriate measures for separatist nationalism are less clear. Brown and Shaw (2002) use indicators of blacks’ support for always voting for black candidates, forming their own political party, having their own separate nation and forming a nation within a nation as measures of separatist nationalism. Yet, while belief in blacks having their own separate nation and comprising a nation within a nation reflect separatist nationalism’s emphasis on becoming more isolated from mainstream society, blacks’ willingness to vote for black candidates and desire to form a black political party appear to stress interactions with the American political system, which seems contrary to separatist nationalism. Yet, as previously mentioned, separatist nationalists engage in the political process as a way to challenge the prevailing racial order. Accordingly, the items stress the importance of supporting black leaders and organizations that will challenge the existing political establishment. In addition to these items, I utilize Davis and Brown’s (2002) measures of support for black children learning African languages, blacks participating in black organizations and black male schools as measures of separatist nationalism. Again, these items reflect the desire for black exclusivity underlying separatist nationalism.
Lastly, three measures of black linked fate employed by Davis and Brown (2002) are included in the analysis to determine whether black nationalism can be distinguished empirically from blacks’ general feelings of racial solidarity. The linked fate variables capture whether respondents perceive their well-being to be linked to the lives of other (1) blacks, (2) black women and (3) black men. Both the nationalism and common fate items were recoded to range from 0 to 1 so that a value of 1 indicates strong agreement with the item and a value of 0 signals strong disagreement. The two research teams also use different analytical techniques to determine the underlying structure of the observed variables. Brown and Shaw’s exploratory factor analysis (EFA) offers suggestive evidence that the two-dimensional model is correct; however, as Davis and Brown argue, while EFA is useful for investigating patterns within data, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) supplies a more rigorous test of a priori hypotheses than EFA. Unlike EFA, which can be performed without any expectations about the underlying structure of the data, CFA tests a priori hypotheses by specifying the measures included within respective latent factors. Accordingly, Davis and Brown (2002) perform a more intensive CFA to reach their conclusions, although with its own share of shortcomings. In the end, the researchers’ different conclusions likely stem from some mix of varied item sets and methodological practices. Since the hypotheses and the variables representing each respective factor are clear, the present analysis utilizes a CFA to judge the validity of each model. To test both the one- and two-dimensional models, several iterations of the confirmatory analysis were performed with the same items included in both Brown and Shaw’s (2002) and Davis and Brown’s (2002) models.

Panel A of Table 1 presents the results for a two-factor model, which tests for an eight-item nationalism factor and a three-item black linked fate factor. The nationalism items utilized in the factor analysis were included in Brown and Shaw’s original article. In addition, the three black common fate items included in Davis and Brown’s (2002) analysis were added to the battery of variables. The results indicate the model does not provide a good fit to the data; the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) fail to reach the conventional level of 0.95 (CFI = 0.91, TLI = 0.91). In addition, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is at 0.10, which provides stronger evidence that the fit of the model is poor (Kaplan 2000). Overall, the weight of the evidence suggests that the one-dimensional black nationalism model fails to sufficiently capture the structure of blacks’ nationalist beliefs.

On the other hand, Panel B of Table 1 reports the estimates from a three-factor CFA that tests dimensions for community nationalism, separatist nationalism and black linked fate using the same host of variables. Measures of support for blacks controlling their government, controlling their economy, shopping in black-owned stores and relying on themselves were used as observable indicators of the community nationalism factor. Furthermore, the separatist nationalism factor consists of items measuring blacks support for voting for black candidates when they run, forming a black political party, creating a separate black nation and the notion that blacks comprise a nation within a nation. The variables comprising each factor are identical to the measures used to create Brown and Shaw’s (2002) community and separatist nationalism dimensions. The CFA shows that the three-factor solution presents a better fit than the two-factor model (CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.06). The findings confirm the validity of Brown and Shaw’s model, although they also show that the indicator of blacks’ belief that they comprise a nation within a nation covaries weakly with the separatist nationalism dimension. These results affirm Davis and Brown’s suspicions about the validity of the “nation within a nation” variable.

Although the three-factor solution using Brown and Shaw’s measures of black nationalism is encouraging, the robustness of the model is also tested with the items from Davis and Brown’s analysis. Panel A of Table 2 shows the estimates from a CFA that accounts for a single ten-item nationalism factor and a three-item black common fate factor. Although Davis and Brown
(2002) conclude that their model for a single factor of black nationalism and a black common fate factor offers the best fitting model when compared to a two-dimensional nationalism construct, the fit indices from the present analysis suggest their model offers a poor fit to the data (CFI = 0.90, TLI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.10). In fact, the model fit using their host of variables is virtually identical to the two-factor solution using items from Brown and Shaw. Overall, the evidence suggests the two-factor solution with a single black nationalism factor fails to capture the dimensionality of blacks’ nationalist beliefs regardless of the group of items included in the analysis.

Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of items in Brown and Shaw’s model along with linked fate items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Panel A</th>
<th>Panel B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-dimensional nationalism model with linked fate items</td>
<td>Brown and Shaw’s model with linked fate items</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Linked fate</td>
<td>Community nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks should shop in black stores</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks control over the economy</td>
<td>1.41 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks control over the government</td>
<td>1.35 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks should rely on themselves</td>
<td>0.80 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist nationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks should vote for black candidates</td>
<td>0.62 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks should form their own political party?</td>
<td>0.87 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black people should have their own separate nation</td>
<td>0.68 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black people should form a nation within a nation</td>
<td>0.24 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked fate items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens to black males affects your life</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens to black females affects your life</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.97 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens to blacks affects your life</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.90 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\chi^2 = 274.81 \quad 106.33 \\
CFI = 0.91 \quad 0.97 \\
TLI = 0.91 \quad 0.97 \\
RMSEA = 0.10 \quad 0.06 \\
n = 898 \quad 898
\]

Factor correlations

Community nationalism
Separatist nationalism
Linked fate

Chi-square statistics in bold indicate the observed relationships significantly differ from the relationships that we would expect by chance.
Alternatively, Panel B of Table 2 presents a three-factor model using the same host of variables. In keeping with Brown and Shaw, the community nationalism factor comprises items that tap support for blacks shopping in black-owned stores, controlling the government and economy in their communities and relying upon themselves. The separatist nationalism factor is comprised of items measuring blacks’ support for participating in black organizations,
voting for black candidates, forming their own political party, having their own separate nation, supporting black male schools and black children learning African languages. These measures reflect a preference for blacks to maintain an institutional and social separateness from mainstream America. The CFA confirms that the three-factor model presents a better fit to the data than Davis and Brown’s two-factor model (CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.07).

After comparing the values of the fit indices from both three-factor solutions, the model using Brown and Shaw’s items has a slightly better model fit than Davis and Brown’s model (RMSEA = 0.06 and 0.07, respectively). According to the conventional standards for covariance structure models, both factor solutions fail to achieve what is considered a superior fit (i.e. RMSEA < 0.05). Nevertheless, each of them provides a fit that is better than what can be generated from a model with a single nationalism factor. Considering the slight differences between both models and in an effort to assess the factor structure of black nationalism on Davis and Brown’s terms, the remaining analysis utilizes the three-factor solution using the items in Davis and Brown.19

I create separate indices for the community nationalism scale (α = 0.76), which is identical to the measure constructed in Brown and Shaw (2002), and separatist scale (α = 0.70).20 In addition, the black common fate measures are combined into a summary scale (α = 0.82). Each of the indices are used in the analysis below to determine the implications of nationalist ideology on black civic life as well as to assess the determinants of both dimensions. In the final analysis, the findings above reveal that, regardless of the battery of variables utilized in the model, nationalism is better represented as a two-dimensional rather than a one-dimensional construct. Moreover, both the community and separatist nationalism dimensions were empirically distinct from the black common fate factor.

### Determinants of community and separatist nationalism

Next, I introduce models of community and separatist nationalism that include indicators of respondents’ perceived linked fate with blacks along with their socio-demographic characteristics. Several of the items, such as age, sex and income, have influenced blacks’ nationalistic attitudes in prior studies (Brown and Shaw 2002; Davis and Brown 2002; Dawson 2001; Tate 1993).

Table 3 shows the OLS estimates for the community nationalism and separatist nationalism scales. While a number of characteristics predict support for both nationalism scales, there are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Community nationalism</th>
<th>Separatist nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linked fate</td>
<td>0.12 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Liberal = 1)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Democrat = 1)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of interviewer (white = 1)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The OLS analyses include unstandardized regression estimates with the standard errors in parentheses. All of the independent variables are recoded on a 0–1 scale, unless indicated otherwise. Estimates in bold indicate $p < 0.05$. 

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T.E. Carey Jr

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some striking differences. The most compelling estimates in the analysis reveal a clear disparity in the incomes of community and separatist nationalists. Supporters of community nationalism tend to be more affluent members of the African-American community. Nevertheless, the strong, negative effect of income for separatist nationalism indicates a large portion of its support comes from lower-income blacks rather than middle-class blacks. This evidence corroborates the findings from Brown and Shaw’s analysis and further demonstrates that while wealthier blacks are attracted to community nationalism’s emphasis upon achieving racial progress through conventional means, less affluent blacks believe that the social structure works contrary to their interests and, therefore, perceive separatist strategies as a more appealing alternative.

The estimates for gender, political ideology and respondents’ region of residence reveal some clear differences between community and separatist nationalists as well. In accordance with my expectations, there is an insignificant effect for gender on community nationalism. Nevertheless, there are clear distinctions in the amount of support that men and women express for separatist nationalism; the estimates reveal that men are stronger supporters of separatist nationalism than women. Furthermore, the regression coefficient for political ideology suggests that separatist nationalists tend to be more politically conservative than individuals with less separatist tendencies. In an effort to determine whether separatist nationalists were actually conservative or merely less liberal members of the black community, an extended analysis was performed by replacing the ideology measure with two dichotomous liberal and conservative variables in the model. Nevertheless, the evidence continued to indicate that separatist nationalism is supported primarily by more conservative blacks. The finding may seem surprising; however, the estimate likely captures the strong undercurrent of conservative beliefs within the separatist movement (Austin 2006). Lastly, blacks living in the south-eastern area of the United States were found to be less supportive of community nationalist beliefs than African Americans living in other regions of the country. Since most of the popular nationalist movements have often taken place in areas outside of the south-east, this finding is not particularly surprising. Yet, there was no evidence that the place of residence predicts support for separatist nationalism.

Although there are clearly characteristics that distinguish community nationalists from separatist nationalists, the analysis also reveals several traits that both groups have in common. First, black linked fate has a positive and significant effect on support for both community and separatist nationalism, which confirms that group attachment is a significant component of both community and separatist nationalism. While examining the determinants of the two-dimensional black nationalism model, Brown and Shaw discover that while the relationship of black linked fate to community nationalism is positive and statistically significant, common fate’s association to separatist nationalism is insignificant. Nevertheless, the conclusions from this study suggest the effect in Brown and Shaw’s analysis was likely due to the limited reliability of either their separatist nationalism or common fate measure.

Additionally, young respondents were found to be more supportive of both community and separatist nationalism, although there is a substantial difference in the size of the effect within both models. The findings show that separatist strategies particularly resonate with young people more than older people. Lastly, blacks questioned by white interviewers were less likely to express support for community and separatist nationalism than blacks interviewed by people of other racial and ethnic identities. This finding substantiates survey researchers’ concerns that blacks supply more socially desirable responses to whites when answering questions that measure more racially militant attitudes (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988; Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 1982; Davis 1997).

Overall, the results from the regression analyses reveal that one-dimensional models of the black nationalist belief system mask the community nationalism and separatist nationalism
dimensions. Both versions amass support from different subgroups within the black community and motivate blacks’ political behavior in distinctly different ways. The fact that community and separatist nationalism attract African Americans with varied socio-demographic characteristics and predict different political consequences is strong confirmation of the validity of both measures.

**Black nationalism and political participation**

In order to test the relationship between each version of nationalist thought and blacks’ political involvement, measures of respondents’ participation in electoral politics as well as non-electoral activities were constructed. Using eight indicators of political participation, I create two indices as measures of campaign involvement and non-electoral participation. The index of campaign involvement includes items asking whether the respondents have: helped in a voter registration drive, driven voters to the polls, given money to a political candidate, attended a fundraiser for a candidate and handed out campaign material or placed campaign material on cars ($\alpha = 0.68$). Given the concerns of Verba and his colleagues about conflating voting behavior with other types of electoral participation, a measure of whether respondents voted in the 1992 presidential election was analyzed separately. On the other hand, the non-electoral participation scale includes items that measure whether respondents attended a protest meeting or demonstration, took part in a neighborhood march, and signed a petition in support of something or against something ($\alpha = 0.53$).²³

Each dependent variable is analyzed in two models that are presented in Table 4. The key variables in models 1, 3 and 5 include the community nationalism and separatist nationalism measures. On the other hand, models 2, 4 and 6 replace the two nationalism dimensions with Davis and Brown’s single nationalism scale in order to compare the difference in the estimates between the nationalism measures. In addition, a three-item index of the black common fate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Campaign involvement</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Non-electoral participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community nationalism</td>
<td>0.19 (0.06)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.57 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist nationalism</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.12 (0.06)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.12 (0.06)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked fate</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (Liberal = 1)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Democrat = 1)</td>
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<td>0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>1.33 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>—0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>—0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>—0.04 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.11 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.77 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.33 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.46 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.14 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>—0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td>—0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>—0.20 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of interviewer (white = 1)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>—0.18 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The OLS and probit analyses include unstandardized regression estimates with the standard errors in parentheses. All of the independent variables are recoded on a 0–1 scale, unless indicated otherwise. Estimates in bold indicate $p < 0.05$. 

---

²³ Each dependent variable is analyzed in two models that are presented in Table 4. The key variables in models 1, 3 and 5 include the community nationalism and separatist nationalism measures. On the other hand, models 2, 4 and 6 replace the two nationalism dimensions with Davis and Brown’s single nationalism scale in order to compare the difference in the estimates between the nationalism measures. In addition, a three-item index of the black common fate
measures is created to determine whether its political effects can be distinguished from black nationalism; Davis and Brown (2002) employ an identical scale in their work.24

Furthermore, a host of socio-demographic variables are included in the analysis. Each nationalism scale is regressed upon indicators of sex (female = 1), age (ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the oldest respondents in the sample), income (ranges from 0 to 1 in $US5000 increments from under $US10,000 to above $US75,000), political ideology (Liberal = 1), party identification (Democrat = 1), years of education (ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 representing 26 years of education) and region of residence (South = 1). Then, given concerns that white interviewers cause black respondents to moderate their responses, the model also includes a measure of the race of the interviewer (white = 1) (Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988; Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 1982; Davis 1997).

Model 1 in Table 4 reports the results of the campaign involvement model. The positive coefficient for community nationalism indicates its supporters tend to be active in political campaigns. The effect is significant and supports the hypothesis that community nationalists tend to be attracted to mainstream forms of political involvement. Conversely, the estimate for separatist nationalism is both negative and insignificant. The negative coefficient suggests that separatist nationalism depresses blacks’ electoral participation; however, since the estimate fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance the effect cannot be accurately interpreted.

Predicted values reveal that, among proponents of community nationalism, there is a substantial increase in respondents that report engaging in campaign activities. From low to high levels of community nationalism, the predicted values for respondents engaging in electoral campaigns increase from 0.29 to 0.47.25 In contrast, reported campaign involvement remains largely unchanged as the level of separatist nationalism increases.26

Model 2 of Table 4 substitutes the community and separatist scales with Davis and Brown’s single nationalism measure. Interestingly, the estimate produces a positive and significant result similar to the effect estimated from the community nationalism index in Model 1. The parallel findings for the community nationalism and single nationalism measures suggest the effect for Davis and Brown’s single nationalism scale can likely be attributed to the influence of the underlying community nationalism dimension within their one-dimensional scale.

Model 3 shows the estimates from a probit analysis of blacks’ voting behavior which reveals a positive, although statistically insignificant, relationship between community nationalism and voting. On the other hand, separatist nationalism has a statistically significant, negative effect. The predicted probabilities for community and separatist nationalism illuminate clear disparities in voter turnout between supporters of both versions of nationalism. Predicted probabilities suggest the estimate for community nationalism is not statistically significant due to a high baseline of voting among blacks; the probability of voting for African Americans that subscribe to neither community nor separatist nationalism is 0.876, which restricts the degree to which community nationalism can increase voting. From African Americans at the bottom to the midpoint of the community nationalism index, the probability of voting increases to 0.939, but then only increases incrementally to 0.957 at the maximum value. Therefore, even though the baseline for voting is high, the probability of voting across levels of community nationalism continues to increase.

Alternatively, the predicted probabilities of voting for separatist nationalists descend at increasing rates across the range of the scale. From the minimum value to the midpoint of the separatist nationalism scale, the probability of voting decreases by almost 10% from 0.876 to 0.781, but then reduces even further to 0.65 at the maximum value. Therefore, community and separatist nationalism predicts distinctly different voting behavior among African Americans; community nationalism motivates blacks to vote, while separatist nationalism dissuades its supporters from showing up to the polls. The result suggests that proponents of separatist nationalism perceive voting as a symbolic validation of the political establishment and, as a consequence, choose to abstain. Interestingly, model 4 indicates the single nationalism scale fails to reach
the conventional level of statistical significance, but its negative coefficient suggests that the scale may be capturing the underlying effect of separatist nationalism.27

Along with disparities in electoral involvement, community and separatist nationalists are also expected to differ in their participation outside of electoral politics. The estimates in model 5 show that this expectation is valid; the effects for community nationalism were found to be positive and significant, while the influence of separatist nationalism on non-electoral activities was negative and insignificant. In addition, the predicted values show that across levels of support for community nationalism, there is a substantial increase in the probability of engaging in non-electoral political activities. As support for community nationalism increases, non-electoral activity increases from almost 0.25 to over 0.40, which as Table 4 reveals is a statistically significant difference. On the other hand, non-electoral political behavior remains stable across levels of support for separatist nationalism.

Model 6 reveals a positive and significant relationship between Davis and Brown’s single nationalism index and respondents’ reported non-electoral behavior. In general, the effect of Davis and Brown’s nationalism measure on both electoral and non-electoral participation appears to be driven by the underlying community nationalism dimension within the scale.

In the final analysis, the results affirm my hypotheses. Supporters of community nationalism tend to engage in electoral and non-electoral politics more than other blacks in the United States, while separatist nationalism has little effect on blacks’ campaign activities and non-electoral participation. Yet, it has a strong, negative influence on voting. Lastly, the relationship between black linked fate and respondents’ electoral and non-electoral involvement is both positive and significant.28 In each case, the effect is in the same direction as the community nationalism scale. However, in the end, the findings show that the political effects of black common fate and community nationalism are empirically distinct from one another.29

Conclusion
This study sheds light on how community and separatist nationalism differentially impact African Americans’ political involvement. Both dimensions offer disparate perspectives on the relationship between the political establishment and black progress. Although concerned with political reform, community nationalists’ commitment to formal institutional channels reflects an underlying belief in the legitimacy of the political establishment. As a consequence, community nationalism drives higher voter turnout and campaign involvement among its supporters. Furthermore, community nationalists’ concern for acquiring greater autonomy for African Americans encourages them to engage in more non-electoral, grassroots-oriented activities as well. Conversely, separatist nationalism represents a deep skepticism of mainstream political institutions’ ability to secure politically and economically autonomous black communities. Separatist nationalists’ disenchantment with the electoral system moves them away from traditionally high levels of voting among African Americans and inspires little participation in campaign activities. Also, separatist nationalists are not any more engaged in non-electoral activities than African Americans that subscribe to neither strain of black nationalism. Ultimately, the conclusions offer nuance to the existing studies of black nationalism in a way that is consistent with the theoretical work that has been generated over the years.

The results of this analysis should encourage students of African-American political attitudes and behavior to include scales for community and separatist nationalism within their empirical models. As the analysis shows, one-dimensional models of black nationalism often conceal the influence of underlying strains within black nationalist thought. More importantly, both indices stand to produce distinct effects for a wide range of political phenomena. Brown and Shaw (2002) demonstrate that supporters of both versions of nationalism hold different beliefs about
the efficacy of securing political allies from other racial and ethnic groups as well as whether African Americans should center their struggle for equality around the issue of race (36). Moreover, community and separatist nationalists likely differ in how they evaluate black political candidates. Community nationalists should be drawn to mainstream black candidates that they believe can win elections and, consequently, secure precious resources for their respective communities. However, separatist nationalists are likely to look more favorably toward candidates that speak to the inherent racial inequalities within the political and economic structure.

Lastly, the results show that strong feelings of racial solidarity do not necessarily lead to support for similar political strategies among African Americans. While linked fate reflects a sense that blacks share similar experiences and viewpoints, group members may differ in the meanings they attribute to group membership (Huddy 2001). For example, racial integrationists are just as likely to be driven by their attachment to other African Americans as black nationalists. Yet, they differ in terms of the meaning and values they attach to group membership. Likewise, group attachment is a key component of each version of nationalism; however, community and separatist nationalism represent different tactical approaches and motivate distinct modes of political behavior. The findings from this study should encourage greater data generation and research that examines the various values and ideologies that shape African-American thought and political behavior.

Acknowledgements

I want to give special thanks to Leonie Huddy for her helpful comments on the manuscript.

Notes

1. Cruse (1967) argues that racial integrationism and black nationalism were conflicting modes of thought among blacks from very early in American history. Martin R. Delany, who was considered the father of black nationalism, was a contemporary of Frederick Douglass, who was the most visible black advocate for racial integration of his day.

2. Community nationalism in this study is similar to what has been called pragmatic nationalism (Shelby 2005), black autonomy (Dawson 1994, 2001) and plural nationalism (Hamilton 1973) in previous studies. Conversely, separatist nationalism has been labeled sovereign nationalism (Hamilton 1973), separatism (Tate 1993) and classical nationalism (Shelby 2005) in earlier work.

3. Separatist tendencies were central to the “back to Africa” movements of Martin R. Delany in the eighteenth century and Marcus Garvey in the nineteenth century.

4. Dawson (2001) highlights the Nation of Islam as a representation of cultural nationalism, or the belief that black advancement hinges on blacks’ recognition of their shared history and cultural traditions. While the Nation of Islam certainly has this emphasis, I argue that cultural nationalism is used to serve the Nation’s separatist objectives.

5. Other versions of nationalism include economic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and cultural nationalism (Dawson 2001).

6. The dominance of both strains of black nationalist thought corresponds with previous work that shows nationalism among minority populations involves efforts to improve the group’s condition by either working within or separating from the prevailing political and economic system. Watson (1990) argues that within minority populations nationalism runs along a continuum between what he calls autonomism, which is equivalent to Brown and Shaw’s conception of community nationalism, and separatism. Ultimately, he contends that supporters of both dimensions choose different strategies in pursuit of identical ends.

7. The mission statement for the Nation of Islam stipulates that if blacks are not provided their own nation-state, the government should secure them equal protection under the law and job opportunities.

8. Among electoral activities, Verba and his colleagues (1995) also make a distinction between campaign activities and contacting elected officials, which they argue offers a better opportunity to communicate information, but less variation in the volume of activity than campaign-related participation.
9. Sniderman and Piazza (2002) argue that both concepts are so closely intertwined that it is virtually impossible to determine the direction of causality between them.

10. This distinction is also what separates traditional measures of black linked fate from black consciousness, which is a more politicized identity that signifies an awareness of blacks’ relative social position in society along with a commitment to achieving group interests.

11. Each item is combined with a measure of respondents’ strength of attachment.

12. I retained the ordinal nature of the black nationalism items unless stated otherwise. Each item has four data points: strongly disagree equals 0, somewhat disagree equals 0.33, somewhat agree equals 0.67, and strongly agree equals 1.

13. The factor analysis was performed with MPLUS, which is beneficial because it can handle categorical variables.

14. The Comparative Fit Index determines whether the specified model is an improvement from a baseline model that assumes complete independence. The Tucker-Lewis Index reduces the sensitivities of the chi-square statistic by utilizing measures of the expected value of the chi-square statistics of the baseline and specified model. Both measures range between 0 and 1 and statistics at or above 0.95 are indicative of good fit.

15. Unlike other measures of model fit, the root mean square approximation of error (RMSEA) assesses whether the model fits approximately well in the population rather than assuming it fits perfectly in the population. Kaplan (2000) states that an excellent fit is reflected by a value less than or equal to 0.05 and values between 0.05 and 0.08 are considered as indications of good fit. Values above 0.08 are understood as indicators of mediocre or poor fit.

16. Davis and Brown (2002) believe that the nation within a nation variable is difficult to interpret. They argue that if respondents interpret the question as blacks should form a separate nation, then it is redundant since the separate nation variable is already included in the model. On the other hand, if respondents interpret it as blacks form a nation within the borders of the United States, it is not a clear indication of support or rejection of black nationalism.

17. Davis and Brown (2002) chiefly utilize the chi-square test to judge the validity of the one- and two-factor models. While suitable in cases that involve small samples, the chi-square statistic’s sensitivity to sample size makes it an inappropriate basis for judging the model fit for the current analysis (Kaplan 2000). Alternatively, the CFI, TLI and RMSEA provide fit statistics that are less sensitive to sample size.

18. Davis and Brown (2002) specify items for the factor structure that are different from Brown and Shaw’s specification, which makes it difficult to compare the fit of both models.

19. Nevertheless, the results using both sets of items produced similar results throughout the analysis.

20. The items associated with each respective factor were combined into additive scales and placed in STATA to perform regression analyses.

21. Moderates were designated as the baseline category.

22. Within Brown and Shaw’s analysis, the black linked fate measure consists of one item that asks respondents what happens to blacks is likely to happen to them. The black common fate measure in the present analysis, as well as Davis and Brown, is a composite scale which has been found to be more reliable than single items (Carmines and Zeller 1979). In addition, as mentioned further above, the separatist nationalism measure is slightly different than the one constructed in Brown and Shaw (2002).

23. Before deciding upon the scale construction, some items were dropped to strengthen the reliability of the index. For instance, when performing an exploratory factor analysis, a measure of contacting elected officials did not load strongly on the campaign involvement factor. This finding is consistent with Verba and associates’ (1995) findings that campaign activities and political contact are distinctly different forms of participation.

24. Davis and Brown (2002) interpret a factor comprised of questions concerning blacks’ linked fate to other blacks, black women and black men as a social identity factor; however, while common fate can be considered a function of social identity, it not only reflects one’s self-identification with a particular group, but also with the social condition of the in-group. Accordingly, throughout this manuscript Davis and Brown’s social identity measure is interpreted as a measure of black linked fate.

25. The predicted values are calculated with gender held at the value for females, the region of residence held at the value for non-southerners and the race of the interviewer held at the value for a black interviewer. The remaining socio-demographic variables are held at their means. Additionally, when calculating probabilities for community nationalism, separatist nationalism is held at zero and, conversely, the probabilities for separatist nationalism are produced with community nationalism held at zero.
I performed separate analyses to explore the relationship between community and separatist nationalism. Davis and Brown (2002) discover a negative and statistically significant result. There are several reasons why the coefficient in the present model fails to reach the conventional level of statistical significance. First, the present model includes measures of respondents’ party affiliation and political ideology, which are absent from Davis and Brown’s model. A model specification identical to Davis and Brown – without applying the survey weight for non-response – produced a negative and statistically significant coefficient for black nationalism. In fact, the magnitude of the coefficient was substantially larger than Davis and Brown’s model; nevertheless, the coefficient for common fate was virtually identical.

Interestingly, when common fate is left out of models 1 and 5, the estimates for community nationalism increase. Additionally, omitting common fate from the model results in a consistently significant effect for gender.

I performed separate analyses to explore the relationship between community and separatist nationalism to the other dependent variables employed in Brown and Shaw (2002, table 3, 36–37). These items include questions about whether blacks believe whites want to keep blacks down, Africa is a special homeland for blacks, other minorities are good allies, blacks should emphasize the struggle around race, and blacks have achieved racial equality. In addition, Brown and Shaw (2002) utilized a thermometer rating for Louis Farrakhan. When performing an ordered probit analysis of whether blacks believe whites want to keep blacks down, the model revealed a positive, but statistically insignificant coefficient for community nationalism (β = 0.52, z = 1.56), while there was a positive and statistically significant effect for separatist nationalism (β = 1.04, z = 3.36), indicating separatist nationalists were more inclined to think whites wanted to keep blacks down than other African Americans. Likewise, an ordered probit analysis of blacks’ belief that Africa is a special homeland for blacks produced a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient for community nationalism (β = 0.23, z = 0.78) and a positive and statistically significant result for separatist nationalism (β = 1.43, z = 5.13), suggesting separatist nationalists tended to think of Africa as a special homeland for blacks. For the measure of whether other minority groups serve as good allies, the results were similar to those of Brown and Shaw (2002). The coefficient for community nationalism was positive and statistically significant (β = 0.66, z = 2.21), while the estimate for separatist nationalism was negative and statistically significant (β = −0.89, z = −3.12). The results demonstrate that while community nationalists tend to favor alliances with other minority groups, separatist nationalists view such alliances more pessimistically. For an ordered probit analysis of whether blacks believe they should emphasize their struggle around race, a negative and statistically significant coefficient for community nationalism (β = −0.94, z = −2.97) suggests that community nationalists are less inclined that other African Americans to focus blacks’ struggles exclusively around issues of race. On the other hand, separatist nationalists are more likely to do so; the model produced a positive and statistically significant coefficient for separatist nationalism.

Another ordered probit was performed to explore blacks’ belief that racial equality had been achieved. This model revealed a positive, but statistically insignificant coefficient for community nationalism (β = 0.47, z = 1.49), but a negative, statistically significant estimate for separatist nationalism (β = −0.67, z = −2.18), indicating proponents of separatist nationalism were more pessimistic about the likelihood of achieving racial equality than other African Americans. Lastly, I employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis on a thermometer rating of Louis Farrakhan. This analysis revealed a marginally positive, statistically insignificant coefficient for community nationalism (β = 0.05, t = 0.80), but a positive and statistically significant effect for separatist nationalism (β = 0.28, t = 5.09). Ultimately, this finding indicates separatist nationalists feel much more positively toward Farrakhan than other African Americans. The reader will notice that my findings are not identical to Brown and Shaw (2002); nevertheless, I would argue my results are more in step with what one would expect from community and separatist nationalism than those revealed in Brown and Shaw (2002).

References


